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Abstract. This paper focuses on the use of knowledge possessed by designers. Data
collection was based on observations (by the cognitive ergonomics researcher) and
simultaneous verbalisations (by the designers) in empirical studies conducted in the context of
industrial design projects. The contribution of this research is typical of cognitive ergonomics,
in that it provides data on actual activities implemented by designers in their actual work
situation (rather than on prescribed and/or idealised processes and methods). Data presented
concern global strategies (the way in which designers actually organise their activity) and local
strategies (reuse in design). Results from cognitive ergonomics and other research that
challenges the way in which people are supposed to work with existing systems are generally
not received warmly. Abundant corroboration of such results is required before industry may
consider taking them into account. The opportunistic organisation of design activity is taken
here as an example of this reluctance. The results concerning this aspect of design have been
verified repeatedly, but only prototypes and experimental systems implementing some of the
requirements formulated on their basis, are under development.
1. Introduction
In a collection of papers presenting the Developments in design methodology, Cross (1984)
presented "prescription of an ideal design process" as the first of the four stages that he
distinguished. This stage, qualified as the period of "systematic design", was reflected by texts
dating from 1962 to 1967. Stages two, three and four were "description of the intrinsic nature
of design activity" (1966-1973), "observation of the reality of design activity" (late 1970s),
and "reflection on the fundamental concepts of design" (1972-1982). Nearly twenty years
after 1984, normative, prescriptive models of design (exemplified by Pahl & Beitz 1977,
1984) are still very powerful —even if the Human Behaviour in Design Symposium (2003,
this book), organised in Pahl and Beitz' Germany with its particularly strong methodological
tradition, testifies to a movement that might correspond to the second and third stages
identified by Cross (1984): Are they stages of a new cycle?
Few models of actual design have been developed, however, and the proposals that have been
made generally focus on particular aspects of the design process (Dorst 1997; Simon 1999;
Visser 2002). In order to formulate such models, it is necessary to observe the actual activities
carried out by designers. Studies conducted in cognitive psychology and cognitive ergonomics
may collect such data. It is this approach to design that is central to this paper which presents
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a cognitive ergonomics viewpoint on individual design activities.
In the rest of this text, unless specified otherwise, the "design" referred to (through
expressions such as "studies on design", or "design is opportunistic") is the actual design
activity implemented by designers during their work on design projects —as opposed to
normatively based descriptions or prescriptions of design methods or design processes.
Outset of the paper. We will describe our approach and illustrate it by data concerning two
design strategies adopted by individual designers, i.e. the opportunistic organisation of design,
and reuse. In our Conclusion, we will discuss the reluctance of industry to accept results that
do not tally with design methods that are to be used in industrial design projects.
1.1 Relevance of data concerning individual design activities
Until some ten years ago, most design research was concerned with individual design. In more
recent years, an important shift in research on the cognitive aspects of design has consisted in
studying, perhaps even to a greater degree, collectively conducted design activities (Blessing,
Brassac, Darses, & Visser 2000; Cross, Christiaans, & Dorst 1996). This change in focus,
which has also been observed in other task domains, has been accompanied by the acceptance
of design as a valid field of research in cognitive ergonomics for which analysis methods are
being developed (Darses, Détienne, Falzon, & Visser, 2001). Yet, a majority of studies on
design are being conducted in artificially restricted laboratory conditions, in which the design
situation is rather different from that in professional design situations (see e.g. most studies in
the 1997 Special issue of Design Studies on Descriptive models of design). Nevertheless,
compared to other problem solving activities, design has started to be examined rather
frequently in actual working situations. Recently, design is even being studied in large-scale
industrial settings (Détienne & Falzon 2001; Visser 1993).
The present text is restricted to individual design. The continuing relevance of data concerning
individual design can be justified on at least three grounds. First, even if many design projects
are undertaken by large teams involving big numbers of designers, engineers and other people;
even if discussion, negotiation, cognitive and operative synchronisation play a crucial role in
the generation and evaluation of solutions; an important proportion of design activity remains
the work of single individuals, especially during distributed-design stages. In addition, even
during co-design stages, cognitive activities in collective design are those implemented in
individual design to which are added activities that are specific to co-operative work. We see
no evidence to suppose that co-operation modifies the nature of the elementary problem
solving processes implemented in design, i.e. solution development and evaluation processes
(Visser 1993). Finally, the development of appropriate work environments for designers, such
as shared and private work spaces in computer-mediated design, requires the analysis of the
links between the different forms of reasoning implemented in both individually and
collectively conducted activities.
1.2 Dynamic aspects of individual design activities
Within the domain of individual design, this paper focuses on its dynamic aspects. Examples
will primarily come from our own work. For some 20 years now, we have been collecting data
on the use of knowledge, generally via design strategies. We did so through empirical studies,
often conducted in the context of industrial design projects in different application domains,
mainly software development, mechanical and industrial design.
The focus on dynamic aspects of design activities, i.e. on the use of knowledge, requires some
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comment. Many studies do indeed concern knowledge that is used in design, or knowledge
that may be used in design. However, these studies seldom concern the way in which this
knowledge is actually used, i.e. the modalities and conditions of their use in design activities.
In one of our first methodological studies on software design, we compared these two aspects
of design knowledge use (Visser 1985, see also Visser & Morais 1991). We confronted two
types of data that we had collected using different data collection methods. Four of the
methods proposed (interviews and analyses of the result of the activity) may reveal
knowledge possessed by designers, but it remains hypothetical if and how they use it. Only
one of the methods (observing designers during their activity) may provide data on knowledge
possessed by designers and on its actual use. The observational method is expensive and can
usually only be applied to a few designers. It thus requires, in general, independent validation
of its results.
2. Actually implemented design strategies
The "systematic design" movement in industrial, engineering and architectural design has its
counterpart in software design, in the form of the "waterfall" model, and other "structured"
and "stepwise refinement" methods. Early empirical studies conducted on design, especially
in the domain of software design, generally characterise designers' activity as following such
methods, i.e. as well structured and even as hierarchically organised, in other words, as
following a pre-established plan. They assert that designers' global control strategy consists in
decomposing their problem according to a combined top-down, breadth-first strategy. Both
are general problem solving strategies that are not specific to design, but can be used in nearly
any problem-solving task. These are the strategies identified, analysed and detailed in classical
problem solving research, from Newell and Simon (1972) on.
In these early design studies, a trend seen was to "conflate prescriptive and descriptive
remarks" on the activity (Carroll & Rosson 1985). Rather than to consider what the activity
was really like, researchers focused on what it should be (Visser & Hoc, 1990). One example
is the study by Jeffries, Turner, Polson and Atwood (1981). According to these authors, "a
reasonable model of performance... ought to be related to accepted standards of good practice"
and "most expert designers are familiar with this literature and may incorporate facets of these
methodologies into their designs" (p. 256).
More recent studies, however, observing designers in realistic situations or even in real work
situations, show that the strategies implemented by these designers deviate from the top-
down and breadth-first prescriptive model, and lead rather to an opportunistically organised
design activity. In our own studies on software design we observed top-down and breadth-
first decomposition strategies to be implemented, but only locally. Their combination did not
seem to be the control strategy of the design activity at the global, organisational level. Other
strategies were implemented at a local level. These could be strategies already identified in the
problem solving research literature, e.g. simulation, or strategies that had not yet been
presented in the literature, e.g. reuse.
The two examples of strategies actually implemented by professional designers when working
on their design projects and presented in this paper, are the global strategy used by designers
in order to organise their activity, i.e. the opportunistic-organisation strategy, and a more
locally applied strategy, i.e. reuse.
Data collection. Data collection in our studies referred to below was based on observation
(by the cognitive ergonomics researcher) and simultaneous verbalisation (by the designers).
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This approach is typical of cognitive ergonomics research, in that it provides data on the
activities implemented by designers in their actual work situation (rather than on prescribed
and/or idealised processes, or on actual activities observed in artificially restricted conditions).
2.1 Opportunistic organisation of design
Already in 1980, Green (1980) concludes a discussion of structured programming methods by
advancing the idea that "good programmers…. leap intuitively ahead, from stepping stone to
stepping stone, following a vision of the final program; and then they solidify, check, and
construct a proper path. That proper path from first move to last move, in the correct order,
is the program, their equivalent of the formal proof." (p. 306) Green notes that Wirth, who
introduced the concept of "stepwise refinement", is himself "quite explicit; having described
his stepwise refinement, [Wirth] says 'I should like to stress that we should not be led to infer
that the actual program development proceeds in such a well organised, straightforward, top-
down manner. Later refinement steps may show that earlier ones are inappropriate and must
be reconsidered.'" (Ibid.)
The qualification that empirical studies on actual design activities use for the way in which
designers organise their activity is "opportunistic" (Visser 1988a). Analysing as a design
activity, the errand planning modelled by Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth (1979) as an
opportunistically organised activity, we followed these authors' approach, and qualified the
organisation of design activity as "opportunistic". We did so because designers' selection of
consecutive design actions is determined by an evaluation function that is primarily based on
the "cognitive economy" criterion, rather than by a pre-established plan, be it hierarchical or
otherwise. Such plans may play a role, and often their role will be important, but they are
only one of several possible resources that provide opportunities for action.
We observed this opportunistic design in different domains, e.g. in a series of studies
conducted on three consecutive stages of an industrial design project: mechanical designers
defining the functional specification for programmable-controller (PC) software design (Visser
1988a); a software engineer designing the PC software (Visser 1987); and a team composed of
a software engineer and mechanical designers "testing" the PC software (but in fact also
redesigning it) (Visser 1988b). In these studies, we identified six categories of data that could
be "taken advantage of" as factors leading to the opportunistic organisation of design.
In this paper, only one category will be presented through an example from the observations
made on `the functional-specifications design (for the other categories and examples, see
Visser 1994). Designers can, for example, take advantage of mental representations of a design
object related to the representations that they are using for their current design action.
Analogy is one example of such a relationship. Considering second-phase tooling operations
(in order to finish the rods) as analogous to the first-phase tooling operations (in order to
shape the rods) on which he is currently working, the designer continually switches between
their specifications. Often he takes advantage of the specification of a first-phase tooling
operation O1 to specify, adapting this O1 specification, its corresponding second-phase
tooling operation O2. Frequently, an O1 specification "makes him think" of an omission or
error made on the corresponding O2 operation.
The observation that designers organise their activity in an opportunistic way is not restricted
to inexperienced designers. On the contrary, it is something typical of expert designers. Nor is
it the translation of a deteriorated behaviour that occurs only when designers are confronted
with a "difficult" design task. Even when expert designers are involved in routine tasks, the
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retrieval of pre-existing plans does not appropriately characterise the organisation of their
actual activity. An analysis of 15 empirical studies on design (Visser 1994) showed that
• even if designers possess a pre-existing solution plan for a design problem,
• and if they can and, in fact, do retrieve this plan to solve their problem (which is often
possible for expert designers confronted with routine design),
• yet if other possibilities for action ("opportunities") are also perceived (which is often the
case in real design)
• and if the designers evaluate the cost of all possible actions ("cognitive" and other costs),
as they will do in real design,
• the action selected for execution will often be an action other than the one proposed by
the plan: it will indeed be a selected opportunity.
Pre-existing plans that —if they are invariably followed— may lead to systematically
organised activities, are only one of the various action-proposing knowledge structures used
by designers. They may be interesting from a cognitive-economy viewpoint because executing
an action for which such a schematic memory representation is available may cost relatively
little if all schema variables relevant for execution have constant or default values. But if other
knowledge structures propose relatively more economical actions, designers may deviate from
such a plan. This is especially true for experts, who may be supposed to possess —or else to
be able to construct without difficulty— a representation of their activity which allows them
to resume their plan later on, when it once again becomes profitable to do so from the
viewpoint of cognitive economy. Having to compare several action proposals and taking into
account the cognitive cost of an action are two task characteristics which probably only
appear in "real" design. This may explain why in laboratory experiments mostly
systematically organised design activities were observed.
"Opportunities" must be "perceived": this perception is data-driven. It is on the basis of their
knowledge that expert designers process the data that they perceive in their environment and
that may take different forms: information (the state of design in progress, but also other
information at the designers' disposal, information they receive, information they construct),
permanent knowledge and temporary design representations (in particular, the designers'
representations of the state of design). Taking advantage of these "opportunities" rather than
following a pre-established plan will, indeed, lead to an opportunistically organised activity.
2.2 Reuse
All use of knowledge could be called "reuse" in that knowledge is based on the processing of
previous experience and data encountered in the past. We reserve "reuse" (vs. other "use" of
knowledge) for the use of specific knowledge (the "source" knowledge) that is at the same
abstraction level as the "target" (the design problem to be solved) for whose processing the
knowledge in question is retrieved. Thus, reuse of knowledge is opposed to the use of more
general, abstract knowledge (such as knowledge structures like schemas and rules).
Reuse has been identified in various empirical design studies. The exploitation of specific
experiences from the past is indeed particularly useful in design, especially in non-routine
design (Visser 1993, 1995a).
Software-engineering researchers distinguish "design for reuse" from "reuse for design". The
construction of reusable entities that are to be organised into a "components library" is often
considered an independent design task, not necessarily executed by the designer who is going
to reuse these entities. We are unaware, however, of any empirical studies conducted in such
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"design for reuse" situations. Existing empirical studies concern "reuse for design" and show
that the two activities are not as separate as software-engineering researchers suppose.
A considerable proportion of the empirical, cognitive ergonomic research on reuse in design
has been conducted in the domain of software, especially that of object-oriented (OO)
software (Détienne 2002). Visser (1987) observed reuse in programmable controller-software
design using a declarative type of language. She also studied reuse in other domains, i.e.
mechanical (Visser 1991) and industrial design (Visser 1995b).
Several aspects of reuse have been examined in these studies. In this paper, we only discuss
the question that is at the basis of reuse-based design, i.e.: When do designers decide to adopt
reuse in order to solve a design problem, rather than base their problem solving on general
knowledge, i.e. proceed to "design from scratch"?
Reuse takes place in, at least, five stages1: 0. construction of a representation of the target
problem; 1. retrieval of one or more sources; 2. adaptation of the source into a target-solution
proposal; 3. evaluation of the target-solution proposal; 4. integration into memory of the
resulting modifications in problem and solution representations.
The construction of a target problem representation (stage 0) has seldom received attention in
empirical studies. It is, however, during this stage that designers have decide whether they are
going to (try to) adopt reuse in order to solve their design problem. We are not aware of any
study informing us about designers taking into consideration the choice between design from
scratch and reuse —rather than to "simply" design from scratch right from the start. Two
individual studies seem to indicate that the "cost" of reuse is the main factor in the decision
process whether to proceed to reuse (Burkhardt & Détienne 1995; Visser 1987).
In an experimental study, Burkhardt asked seven OO-software designers to describe elements
they might want to (re)use. Half of his subjects mention that there are reusable elements
whose actual reuse they would not envision because of the "cost" of their reuse. Data gathered
by Visser (1987) present an example of a factor contributing to the cost of reuse —but only
once candidate sources, i.e. reusable solutions, have been retrieved. This factor is the cost of
required adaptation, itself a function of target-source similarity. Sources are indeed always to
be adapted, in order to be usable as a possible solution to a target problem that is "similar" to
the source problem that had been solved by the source. This conclusion coincides with a
position adopted in several case-based reasoning (CBR) systems in which the selection of a
"case", i.e. a reusable source, is guided by its adaptability (Smyth & Keane 1995).
The importance of the "cost" factor in the choice of a strategy such as reuse is completely in
line with our identification of the primordial factor underlying the organisation of design, i.e.
cognitive economy (Visser 1994). It is the relative cost of an action that determines its choice
—if a designer is conscious of several possibilities.
With respect to the frequency of reuse, different authors in the domain of software
engineering assert that 40 - 80 % of code is non-specific, thus reusable. Many authors advance
the percentage of 80 %, mostly referring to Jones (1984), who summarises four studies
conducted between 1977 and 1983. In 1989, however, Biggerstaff and Perlis assert that "over
the broad span of systems, reuse is exploited today but to a very limited extent".
Empirical studies providing quantitative data all concern OO software, which, due to its
mechanisms of inheritance, abstraction and encapsulation, and polymorphism, is considered
to particularly "favour reuse", so the conclusions of these studies may be specific to this form
                                                
1 Our use of the term "stage" does not mean that such stages are purely consecutive, and that a
previous stage cannot be returned to subsequently.
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of software design. As far as we know, the only empirical study observing "massive" reuse
concerns OO software (Lange and Moher 1989). If empirical studies on other design tasks do
not provide data on the frequency of reuse, experimental studies on analogical reasoning can
inform us. Their general conclusion is that source retrieval seldom occurs "spontaneously", i.e.
without having been suggested by the experimenter —which  often occurs in these studies.
The data available on reuse-based design vs. design from scratch is thus still very meagre.
Nevertheless, it is a central topic with respect to reuse, its role in design, and the possibilities
to support designers in their reuse during design.
3. Conclusion
Our results concerning the organisation of design may inspire, at least, two approaches to
design assistance: given the opportunistic organisation of the activity of designers working "in
total freedom", one may either try to use tools to prevent such a way of proceeding, or offer
designers tools that would assist them in their "natural" way of proceeding. As a researcher in
cognitive ergonomics, we consider that assistance tools should be compatible with the actual
activity, i.e. with the designers' mental structures and processes. If designers' activities are
opportunistically organised because of reasons of cognitively interesting management, a
support system which supposes —and therefore imposes— a hierarchically structured design
process will at the very least constrain designers and may well even handicap them. Most
tools continue, however, to be based on prescriptive or analytical, task-based models of
design, i.e. not on data concerning the actual activity that is to be supported.
Results from cognitive ergonomics and other research that challenge the way in which people
are supposed to work with existing systems are generally not received warmly. Abundant
corroboration of such results is required before industry may consider taking them into
account. The opportunistic organisation of design activity can be taken as one example of this
reluctance. The results concerning this aspect of design have been verified repeatedly now,
requirements for systems offering designers "real" support have been formulated on the basis
of these results (see e.g. Visser & Hoc 1990), but only prototypes and experimental systems
implementing some of these requirements are under development. An example of a software
design environment based on the results concerning opportunism is GOOSE (Generalised
Object Oriented Support Environment), the experimental CASE (Computer Assisted
Software Engineering) tool for OO software design developed at the University of Keele by
David Budgen and colleagues. One of the specifications for GOOSE was that it should enable
its users to adopt an opportunistic strategy in developing their ideas. However, no
commercial tools integrating these elements are available for use in industry, i.e. in "real"
design, which is the focus of this paper.
Certain findings presented in this text may seem "obvious": one might think that any sensible
person, especially a designer, might formulate them "simply" on the basis of their experience,
or even of their common sense. One might think that no empirical studies are required to
obtain the knowledge corresponding to these results. Studies in the domain of cognitive
psychology and ergonomics teach us, however, that such "common-sense" judgements
concerning "obvious" phenomena are fallacious, even if they correspond to the intuition of
people who are proficient in the domain. Contrary to a widespread opinion, the fact that
designers deviate from, or even do not follow at all, procedures that are prescribed by the
majority of design methods, is not due to designers being nonchalant, making errors or
displaying other deficiencies. These deviations or even abandoning of imposed structures have
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cognitive causes that are worth being examined and especially taken seriously in the
development of design environments or other support modalities for designers.
Precisely because of their grounding in empirical studies conducted in real, complex situations,
following the research methodology of cognitive psychology, these data are valuable as a basis
for such system development. They constitute a basis that is more valuable than, on the one
hand, psychological research conducted in restricted laboratory conditions, or, on the other
hand, models based on introspection, norms, or other prescription-based models.
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